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program. (Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter
joined the majority decision. ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas dissented.)
Justice O'Connor acted as the swing vote in the close de
cision, as she voted to uphold the affirmative action program
in Gruffer, even though in two previous affirmative action de
cisions, Justice O'Connor had written the majority decision
in which the Court struck down race conscious affirmative
action programs. In Adarand v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995),
O'Connor voted to strike down a federal government minor
ity business set-aside, and in City ofRichmond v. Croson, 488
U.S. 469 (1989), she voted to strike down a local government
minority business set-aside. Perhaps an explanation for
O'Connor's change in positions can be attributed to the fact
that in Adarand and Croson, the Court was dealing with race
conscious remedies in government contracting, whereas
Gruffer involved the use of race in higher public education
admissions practices.
Grutter is an important decision, as it clarified several is
sues left open by the Court's earlier affirmative action deci
sions. For the first time, a majority of the Justices agreed that
the goal of having a racially diverse student body is a com
pelling state interest under equal protection strict scrutiny.
Under equal protection doctrine, any racial classification en
acted by the government must be subject to the two-prong
strict scrutiny test. First, the court must determine if the state
has a compelling state interest, and if so, whether the policy or
statute is narrowly tailored to further that compelling state
interest. What was contested in this case was whether the
promotion of diversity in higher education should be con
sidered a compelling state interest.
The racial diversity rationale was first developed and dis
cussed in Bakke v. University of California, 438 U.S. 265
(1978), in which Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion that
failed to command a majority ofthe Justices, held that a state
may constitutionally use race conscious affirmative action
programs to ensure a diverse student body. In Grutter, Justice
O'Connor quoted extensively from Powell's Bakke opinion
and reaffirmed Powell's assertion that diversity is a com
pelling state interest firmly grounded in the First Amend
ment principle that a paramount goal of educational institu
tions is to select students who will contribute to a "robust
exchange ofideas." Accordingly,Justice O'Connor concluded
that the Court must give some deference to an educational
institution when it declares that a racially diverse student
body is necessary for it to effectively advance its First
Amendment-based pedagogical mission.
Once Justice O'Connor established that institutions of
public higher education may give preferences to racial minor
ity applicants in order to further the compelling state inter
est in attaining a diverse student body, she then applied the
second prong of the strict scrutiny test, and determined that
the law school's admissions policy was narrowly tailored to
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he U.S. Supreme Court wrapped up its 2002-03 Term
by handing down several key Fourteenth Amendment
equal protection decisions. In Grutter v. Bollinger, 123
S. Ct. 2325 (2003), and in the companion case Gratz v.
Bollinger, 123 S. Ct. 2411 (2003), the Court established that
narrowly tailored race conscious affirmative action programs
can indeed survive heightened judicial scrutiny. In Gruffer,
the Court upheld the University ofMichigan Law School's
affirmative action policy as a narrowly tailored use ofrace, but
in Gratz, the Court struck down the University ofMichigan's
undergraduate affirmative action admissions policy because
the Court concluded that the policy in effect acted as a rigid
quota and hence was not narrowly tailored.
In Gruffer, a white student applied for admissions to the
University ofMichigan Law School and had her application
denied. The student then filed a lawsuit against the law
school in federal district court, alleging that the law school's
policy of considering race as a factor in its admissions crite
ria violated her rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause. The district court in Gruffer struck
down the law school's admissions policy, as it determined
that the law school's interest in using race to attain a racially
diverse student body was not a compelling state interest and
that even if it were, that the law school's policy was not nar
rowly tailored to further that interest.
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's decision,
holding that based on the Bakke precedent, the interest in
racial diversity is a compelling state interest, and further, that
the law school's use of race was narrowly tailored because it
was only a factor in the school's admission decision and did
not operate as a rigid quota mandating that certain seats be
reserved for racial minority students.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to plaintiff's ap
peal, and in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, the
Court voted 5-4 to uphold the law school's affirmative action

further its interest in a diverse student body. The key point for
O'Connor was that the law school's admissions policy as
sessed each applicant in a highly individualized, flexible,
"holistic" manner, in which "race" was but one factor among
several considerations that the law school took into account
in making its admissions decisions.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor emphasized that the law
school's policy makes clear that when it states that its goal is to
have a diverse student body, it uses the term "diversity" in the
broadest sense, and that the law school gives "substantial
weight to diversity factors besides race." The law school's pol
icy, noted O'Connor, "makes clear that there are many possi
ble bases for diversity admissions, and provides examples of
admittees who have lived or traveled widely abroad, are flu
ent in several languages, have overcome personal adversity and
family hardship, have exceptional records of extensive com
munity service, and have had successful careers in other
fields." That the law school frequently admitted nonminority
candidates with lower grades and test scores over qualified un
derrepresented racial minorities helped to convince O'Connor
that the law school truly applied its admissions policy in a flex
ible manner and did not operate as a de facto "quota system."
While upholding the government's ability to enact race
conscious affirmative action programs, Justice O'Connor
ended her opinion by emphasizing that "any race conscious
admissions policies must be limited in time." She admon
ished the law school to keep its word to "terminate its race
conscious admissions programs as soon as possible" and con
cluded by predicting that "in 25 years from now, the use of
racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the
interest approved today." Justice O'Connor seemed to be
sending the message that affirmative action has a twenty-five
year time limit, and that if the law school or any other public
education institution is still relying on race conscious admis
sions policies, then the Court would more likely than not
strike such programs down as unnecessary reliance on race.
Although the Grutter decision reaffirmed the government's
ability and authority to use race conscious measures as a way
to open up educational opportunities for underrepresented
racial minorities in higher education, it did so in a way to min
imize and deflect attention away from the primary goal of af
firmative action programs: the promotion ofequality ofoppor
tunity for disadvantaged racial groups in the United States.
The Court emphasized the important pedagogical benefits
that a diverse student body provides for students of all races
and emphasized the importance of a diverse student body as a
way to further the First Amendment value of academic free
dom. Yet, it failed to explicitly recognize the systemic factors
that make affirmative action programs necessary-the con
tinuing socioeconomic inequalities experienced by African
Americans, Latino-Americans, and Native Americans.
Such an omission did not escape the attention ofJustice
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who, in a concurring opinion joined
by Justice Breyer, made sure to emphasize what Justice O'
Connor did not in her majority opinion: that "conscious and
unconscious race bias, even rank discrimination on the basis
of race, remain alive in our land, impeding realization ofour
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highest values and ideals." Justice Ginsburg cited to statistics
showing that African-American and Hispanic students con
tinue to experience racial segregation in elementary and sec
ondary public schools, and that such students in many states
are lacking in educational resources. Although Justice
O'Connor seemed to place the responsibility on the law
school to ensure that it will not have to use race conscious
measures in twenty-five years, Justice Ginsburg made sure
to emphasize that whether the law school and other institu
tions need to use affirmative action programs in twenty-five
years will depend on circumstances beyond their control, and
that, depending on whether equal educational opportunity in
America's primary and secondary public schools is achieved,
the law school may still need to rely on race conscious mea
sures even twenty-five years from now.
However, even though Justice O'Connor's opinion could
have more explicitly recognized the central role that continu
ing socioeconomic inequality continues to hamper the edu
cational opportunities ofunderrepresented racial minorities,
her opinion does leave an opening for legal advocates to de
velop new theories to justify the use of race conscious mea
sures in the education and government procurement context.
For example, the Court clarified an important question re
garding the equal protection strict scrutiny test. An issue that
had split the circuit courts was whether the only interest a state
could put forth to justify its use of a racial classification is the
interest in remedying the effects ofits own past racial discrim
ination. The Court clearly rejected this narrow interpretation
ofthe Court's equal protection doctrine and held that the gov
ernment may be able to articulate other interests that may meet
the "compelling interest" standard besides the interest in reme
dying one's own past discrimination. Hence, in Grutter, the
Court held that the attainment of a diverse student body is a
"compelling interest" for purposes ofequal protection.
Grutter therefore opens up the possibility that, in addi
tion to the remedying past discrimination and promoting di
versity rationales, the Court may accept other rationales for
affirmative action as "compelling state interests," in addition
to diversity interest and remedying past discrimination inter
est. For legal advocates seeking to develop alternative com
pelling interests to justify affirmative action, the Grutterdeci
sion strongly suggests that the Court is more likely to accept
an interest as compelling if that interest is rooted in a consti
tutional principle, just as the diversity rationale is rooted in
the First Amendment. Thus, using similar reasoning, the
government may rely on Grutter to use other constitutional
amendments as the basis for articulating a compelling state
interest for equal protection strict scrutiny purposes.
For example, government institutions, instead ofusing the
First Amendment based student body diversity rationale,
could instead justify their affirmative action programs as a
way to further the compelling state interest in attaining a
racially integrated student body, an interest that is rooted in
both the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition against slav
ery and the badges and incidents of slavery and the Four
teenth Amendment prohibition against deJure segregation.
See Elizabeth S. Anderson, Integration, Affirmative Action,
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and Strict Scrutiny, 77 N.Y.U. L. REv.1195 (2002) (articulat
ing racial integration as a compelling state interest under
equal protection strict scrutiny analysis).
Although it is beyond the scope of this article to fully lay
out how the Thirteenth Amendment can be used as the basis
for justifying racial integration as a compelling state interest,
a few tentative points can be made. Under the Thirteenth
Amendment, the federal and state governments have a duty
to eliminate the existence of slavery or the badges and inci
dents ofslavery, regardless ofwhether or not "state action" has
caused or contributed to the existence ofsuch. It could bear
gued that racial groups that suffer from the badges and inci
dents of slavery are those groups who continue to be saddled
with indicia ofinferiority and second-class citizenship status.
Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment could provide the ratio
nale for an affirmative action program focused on eliminat
ing the indicia of racial inferiority and second-class status
that saddle certain historically disadvantaged racial groups.
There are several advantages to justifying affirmative ac
tion on racial integration grounds rather than racial diversity
grounds. First, an affirmative action program seeking to pro
mote racial integration in the student body and society as a
whole would put attention directly on the continuing exis
tence ofsocioeconomic racial inequality in the United States.
Such a rationale would be truer to the spirit and purpose of

the Reconstruction Amendments than the First Amend
ment based racial diversity rationale. Second, when an affir
mative action program is justified on grounds that it is seek
ing to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery, it cannot
be forced to be "sunset" or ended prematurely, because the
duty to eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery ends
only when such treatment of racial groups is thoroughly
eradicated from society. To be sure, Justice O'Connor's con
cerns that race conscious policies will turn into a permanent
racial spoils system are valid, and any attempt to argue for the
continuing necessity of race conscious measures must ade
quately address such concerns.
Third, the Thirteenth Amendment interest in racial in
tegration as a way to eliminate the badges and incidents of
slavery also could justify the use ofrace conscious measures to
remedy continuing societal racial inequality. While the Court
has held that the government may use a racial classification to
remedy past identified discrimination, it has suggested that
it may not enact affirmative action programs to remedy the
effects of"societal discrimination." In other words, the Court
has been reluctant to uphold affirmative action programs
seeking to address the effects of continuing socioeconomic
racial inequality in the United States. The Court has never
had to decide, however, whether the government has the au
thority to remedy societal racial inequality as a way to pursue
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the goals of the Thirteenth Amendment. Because the cen
tral purpose ofthe Thirteenth Amendment is to prohibit and
eliminate the badges and incidents of slavery in society, it
would seem logical that it could provide the legal justification
for enacting affirmative action programs that specifically seek
to remedy"societal discrimination."
By no means does the Grutter case signal that the Court is
now more open to arguments seeking to expand the scope of
affirmative action. At the very least, however, Grutter has given
legal advocates and government institutions at least a twenty
five year time frame to develop new programs to ensure ade
quate representation ofracial minorities in higher education.
Finally, in the companion case, Gratz v. Bollinger, the
Court reaffirmed Grutter's holding that the government has a
compelling state interest in furthering racial diversity. In
Gratz, however, a case involving an equal protection chal
lenge to the University ofMichigan undergraduate admis
sions policy, the Court, in a 6-3 decision written by Justice
William Rehnquist, struck down the undergraduate admis
sions policy, holding that the practice ofgiving certain under
represented racial minorities 20 points of the 100 points
needed to gain admissions was not narrowly tailored to fur
ther its compelling interest in racial diversity. The primary
difference between the law school policy and the undergrad
uate policy was while the law school policy was administered
in a highly individualized, holistic manner, in which racial
minorities were not guaranteed a slot by virtue of their racial
minority status, the undergraduate policy, by automatically
giving 20 points to underrepresented racial minorities in ef
fect guaranteed their admissions to the school, and thus, for
the Court, the policy operated as an unconstitutional "de
facto" racial quota.

The SEC Sends a Message
(continued from page 1)

investment risks ofthe particular bonds and accounting prac
tices of municipal issuers in both primary disclosure docu
ments (the basic bond offering materials) and also secondary
disclosures-after the bonds have been sold to investors and
are being traded in the market.
The SEC has been active in taking actions against munic
ipalities that did not disclose bad financial news in bond doc
uments. The SEC took action against Maricopa County,
Arizona, for failing to disclose a decline in its financial posi
tion and the necessity for it to use bond proceeds to balance
its budget. Maricopa County, Arizona, Securities Act of
1933 Rel. No. 33-7354 (Oct. 3, 1996). Likewise, the SEC
took action against the City of Syracuse for misstating in
bond documents a budget surplus when a deficit actually ex
isted and for characterizing unaudited financial statements as
having been audited. City of Syracuse, New York, Securities
Act of1933 Rel. No. No. 33-7460 (Sept. 30, 1997).
In perhaps the most significant enforcement action in re
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cent years, the SEC took aim at Miami's disclosures during
times of financial difficulty. In the early 1990s, the City of
Miami began experiencing fiscal difficulties. City ofMiami,
supra. The city's financial advisers and auditors warned that it
would run out of operating cash. Id. At a meeting of senior
city staff, one elected commissioner, and mid-level staff, to
discuss the potential and (under Florida law, illegal) operat
ing deficit for FY 1994, the participants determined that
based on past experience, the city council would not raise
taxes or increase fees. Id. The only way they believed they
could balance the budget was to issue bonds and use the bond
proceeds to finance city operations. Id. The city began a pro
gram to eliminate waste and redundancy within the munici
pal government, but this program would not seriously impact
the operating deficit confronting the city. Id. The city's finan
cial condition continued to deteriorate and the city eventu
ally declared a fiscal emergency, prompting the governor to
appoint a fiscal oversight board to take control of the city's
finances. Id.
Before the appointment of the state oversight board, the
city faced enough ofan operating deficit that it could not pay
its bills and employees through legal means. Id. Nevertheless,
despite the deterioration of its financial condition from bad
to worse, in the official statements for three bond issues dur
ing this time, the city represented its budget to be balanced.
Id. The disconnect between the city's financial position as de
scribed in the official statements for the bond issues and the
city's financial position as described in its audits and com
prehensive annual financial reports was problematic for the
SEC. As the SEC dryly observed, "A reasonable investor
would have considered it important to know that Miami
could not generate sufficient revenues to pay its bills or em
ployees. The fact that Miami needed to use bond proceeds
to satisfy operational expenses demonstrated the gravity ofits
cash flow deficit, and, thus, the City's need to disclose this
fact to public investors and the market place." Id.
Miami countered by arguing that its auditors had not is
sued a "going concern" qualification to its financial report.
Id. A "going concern" qualification indicates that the subject
will not be able to meet its obligations in the next twelve
months. The SEC found, however, that only the infusion of
bond proceeds prevented the auditors from giving a going
concern qualification. In other words, only the illegal use of
bond proceeds enabled Miami to argue that it did not merit a
going concern qualification.
Miami also argued that it had relied on its auditors and
other professionals for information on what to disclose in its
official statements. Id. The SEC rejected this argument on
two grounds. First, "Primary responsibility for the accuracy of
information filed with the Commission and disseminated
among investors rests upon the municipality." Id. Second, the
SEC noted, "the record is unclear as to whether and to what
extent Miami consulted with or relied on professionals." Id.
The SEC also found that Miami had acted with scienter,
based on circumstantial evidence concerning what its officials
knew, but also upon the city's dismissal of the importance of
the bond documents, as evidenced by the testimony of its
State & Local Law News, Volume 27, Number 1, Fall 2003

then city manager quoted at the beginning of this essay. Id
What then, are elected laypeople to make ofthese actions?
On the one hand, trying to ascertain whether a municipality
relies too much on interest income seems a little much to ask
of politicians. On the other hand, the failure to mention in
bond documents that the municipality has trouble meeting
payroll seems akin to lying on a mortgage application. More
over, blaming the finance professionals does not seem to be a
productive strategy. To the extent that the SEC has to both
er with a municipal debt issue, it is a safe bet that the SEC
will be examining the conduct of all the professionals con
nected with the transaction.
The dangers inherent in the blame the professionals ap
proach are obvious in the Miami litigation. First, the SEC re
iterated that professionals notwithstanding, the primary re
sponsibility for accuracy of information in an official
statement lies with the issuer. Second, the SEC questioned
the record evidence concerning how much the city had, in
fact, relied on professional advice. One may well question the
degree of finger pointing and backside covering going on
from the financing professionals back toward the city. The
third consequence is found in statements in the SEC opinion:
"The fact that Miami has pointed its finger at Deloitte, and
other bond professionals, without taking any responsibility for
its own conduct, suggests that Miami has not accepted fully its
responsibility for the City's financial disclosures .... The City
must be given the clear message ... that Miami is responsible
for the adequacy of its financial disclosures when seeking
money from the investing public." City ofMiami, supra. No
tionally, it is a bad thing when a federal regulatory agency feels
compelled to "send a message" to a municipality.
There are, however, general steps and specific steps that,
if taken, could prevent municipalities from having to receive
messages from federal regulators. At the general level, lay
elected officials must have some awareness of the financial
condition of their municipality. They must pay attention to
what is going on around them. They must also respect the
bond documents. It is no longer acceptable to have a "who
reads these documents?" attitude.
As a specific guide, there are certain questions that elected
officials should ask and to which they should receive answers.
The questions are found in a brochure the SEC published in
1996, entitled "(),!iestions to Ask Before You Approve a
Bond Issue."This brochure contains ten questions elected of
ficials should ask themselves and their staffs and five ques
tions that they should ask their outside professionals. The
questions are set forth below. Ifthese questions are asked, and
accurately answered, and the elected officials make their de
cisions based on these answers, elected officials can avoid the
need for the SEC to have to send them a message.

<zyestions Officials Should Ask Themselves
and Their Staffs
1. How have we allocated responsibilities for the preparation
of the official statement? Have we clearly defined the re
sponsibilities of all participants in the transaction?
2. What processes or procedures have been established to se
State & Local Law News, Volume 27, Number 1, Fall 2003

3.

4.

5.

6.
7.
8.

lect qualified outside professionals? How are we relying on
them and is our reliance appropriate? How are they being
compensated?
What have we done to establish the accuracy of financial
and operating information and its disclosure in the official
statement? Has anything happened since the date of the
financial statements that needs to be disclosed?
What policies and procedures have we developed to de
termine whether material conflicts of interest exist that
need to be disclosed?
What procedures have we established to accurately de
scribe the project, the bond terms, the sources of repay
ment, and the risks associated with the project? What pro
cedures have we established for the investment and
disbursement of the bond proceeds?
Do our procedures permit the underwriters to carry out
their "due diligence" and other responsibilities?
Have we fully considered any questions asked by the rat
ing agencies?
What continuing disclosure responsibilities have we as
sumed and what procedures have we established to meet
them? Who will determine and file the annual financial
and material event disclosure information? Have we des
ignated an individual to speak to the market on our be

half?
9. If we are relying on the bond counsel, financial advisor, or
trustee to evaluate and meet our continuing disclosure re
quirements, what procedures are in place to keep them ap
prised ofour financial condition and other material infor
mation?
10.Have our procedures produced an official statement that
we feel accurately presents our financial condition and dis
closes the information a reasonable investor needs to
know? Have all the right people reviewed it?

Questions Officials Should Ask Outside Professionals
1. What is the nature or scope ofthe written opinion or cer
tification, if any, that you are giving in this transaction and
relating to the disclosure document? Have we given you
access to the information you need?
2. Have you explained to us all aspects ofthe structure or na
ture ofthis transaction so that you are confident we fully un
derstand all critical aspects? Does our official statement ad
equately address any concerns you have about this
transaction that a reasonable investor would consider im
portant?
3. Are there any matters regarding your participation in this
transaction about which you should make us aware, in
cluding potential conflicts ofinterest?
4. Has your review of the relevant financial documents and
other materials, including the official statement, raised
any concerns regarding this borrowing? Do these concerns
need to be disclosed?
5. Are you aware ofany circumstances in which we, our staff,
or others have not complied with our procedures so that
we can make sure that our official statement adequately
and accurately describes this transaction?
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